"Don't panic": a primer on airline deregulation by Paul W. Bauer
"Don't Panic"': A Primer 
on Airline Deregulation 
by Paul W. Bauer 
The old dictum says that if the Devil did not exist, the Church 
would have had to invent him. Similarly, if the regulator didn't 
exist, the airline industry would have had to invent him-and 
did in 1938. A current question is what would happen to the 
industry were it totally deregulated. One thesis is that there 
would be a rush by existing and new entrants to those routes 
thought to be profitable. Other routes would be abandoned. 
Price competition would be destructive. With the essential link 
between economics and safety there would be an inevitable 
major air disaster, possibly involving a prominent Member of 
Congress. Public outcry and congressional responses would 
lead to the re-establishment of regulation. Since this was the 
sequence of events in the mid-30's, why re-learn that lesson? 
This thesis has been challenged, but the lesson of history .  .  . 
cannot be totally ignored. 
Secor D.  Browne, Chairman 
Civil Aeronautics Board 
(January 1972)2 
Introduction 
Former Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)  Chairman 
Browne's statement 15 years ago can scarcely be 
interpreted as an unqualified endorsement of the 
government's current policy of airline deregula- 
tion. It does remind us, however, that the issue of 
airline regulation has been controversial for quite 
some time. 
The Civil Aeronautics Act  (CAA)  of 
1938, enacted to counteract the alleged condi- 
tions of competitive instability of an industry then 
in its infancy, began 40 years of pervasive 
government regulation by the now-defunct CAB. 
With passage of the Airline Deregulation Act 
(ADA) of 1978, the federal government com- 
pleted an about-face in policy and reintroduced 
competitive forces into the market. 
For eight years now, the airline 
industry has been experiencing a great deal of 
turmoil, as evidenced by the large number of 
entries, mergers, and bankruptcies. Much of this 
turmoil, however, is not the result of deregula- 
tion, but rather of the fuel price increase in 1979, 
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of the recession in the early 1980s, and of the air 
traffic controllers' strike in August 1981. Even so, 
the regulation debate is heating up again as the 
events predicted by Mr. Browne seem to be 
unfolding-with such examples as the recent 
bankruptcy of Frontier Airlines, the financial prob- 
lems of People Ekpress and Eastern Airlines, and 
the crash of the Aeromexico airliner in southern 
California in August 1986. 
This paper analyzes the conditions 
that prevailed under CAB regulation and that led 
to the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. These 
conditions are contrasted with the ekcts  of 
deregulation observed so far. Finally, an attempt 
is made to predict the future evolution and per- 
formance of the U.S. airline industry under 
deregulation. 
I.  The U.S. Airline Industry 
Under CAB Regulation 
Between 1938 and 1978, the CAB maintained 
strict control over the two most important decisions 
airlines had to make: where to fly and how much 
to charge. This meant that airlines could only 
compete with one another by offering a higher 
quality of service (primarily more frequent flights 
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and other amenities). Studies have shown that 
CAB  regulation led to more Erequent flights and 
to lower load factors (the proportion of seats on a 
flight that are filled by paying passengers) than 
would be normal in a competitive airline industry.3 
Since these actions resulted in high- 
er costs for the airlines, and since the CAB  was 
charged with maintaining the financial health of 
the industry (that is, preventing losses), it follows 
that fares were higher. In fact, the interstate carri- 
ers subject to CAB  regulation marked up fares 20 
to 95 percent more than the intrastate carriers not 
subject to CAB  regulation for similar routes.* The 
General Accounting Office (GAO) estimated that 
passengers could save up to $2 billion dollars or 
more per year with competitive fares.5 
11.  The Theory Behind Deregulation 
Given fare markups of these magnitudes, why 
were the airlines' earnings so mediocre? The an- 
swer appears to be that regulated industries do 
not have sufficient incentives to control costs. 
Given the CAB'S mandate to maintain the health 
of the industry by raising fares whenever the air- 
lines experienced hard times and the lack of a 
threat of competitive entryC(the  CAB  had not al- 
lowed the formation of a single new trunk airline 
from 1938 to 1978), a strong prima facie case 
exists for inadequate cost control. Using data 
from 1972 to 1978, Bauer (1985) found that, on 
average, airline costs during that period were 48 
percent over the minimum cost of providing the 
same service. 
Another example of the poor in- 
centive structure can be found by analyzing labor 
costs. Providing a service product-transportation 
between two points-airlines could not stockpile 
their output in anticipation of a strike. Any output 
diverted by one carrier (either to other carriers, 
or to other transportation modes) as a result of 
the strike is a permanent loss to that carrier. 
Further, even when the strike is settled, the air- 
line may lose some of its customers to other car- 
riers. Regulated airlines could not offer large dis- 
counts and free flights to lure their customers 
back, as United Airlines did after a strike in 1979. 
Under CAB regulation, strikes were very costly to 
the airlines, but higher labor costs could be 
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absorbed by CAB  fare increases or CAB  approval 
to enter some profitable new route. Thus, there 
was little incentive for airlines to endure strikes. 
Given the evidence on fare mark- 
ups and the suspicions about airline inefficiency, 
proponents of deregulation became convinced 
that elimination of CAB  regulation, and a move 
towards more competition in the industry, would 
be beneficial to travelers and, ultimately, to the 
industry itself Two basic tenets drive the model 
of the industry that proponents of deregulation 
had in mind: one, that the minimum efficient 
scale size is reached at a relatively low level of 
output and, two, that new entry and the threat of 
new entry into the industry would ensure suffi- 
cient competition to hold fares close to marginal 
cost and only allow firms to earn a normal pr~fit.~ 
Numerous studies performed prior 
to deregulation, using various data sets from the 
late 1950s forward, found that larger airlines had 
no significant unit-cost advantage (measured in 
passenger miles) over smaller airlines. This 
research implied that there was plenty of room in 
the U.S. airline industry for anywhere from 20 to 
100 efficiently sized airlines (see White [1979]), 
and that there was little chance of concentration 
increasing in the industry if it were deregulated. 
The second tenet, that freedom of 
entry would severely limit any market power that 
an airline may have, was being strongly sup- 
ported by the new theory of contestable markets 
(see Baumol, Panzar, and Willig 119821). Simply 
stated, this theory predicts that if  market entry 
and exit involves no irrecoverable costs and can 
occur quite rapidly, the threat of entry is sufficient 
to ensure that firms in this market earn no more 
than a normal profit. 
The following illustrates how this 
result occurs. Suppose the firms in a contestable 
market decided to collude and to raise their 
prices. Although the strategy might work in the 
very short run, soon new firms not party to this 
agreement would recognize the opportunity for 
above-normal profits and would enter the indus- 
try, driving prices back down. In a contestable 
market, even a monopolist would thus earn a 
normal profit, because if it tried to take 111 
advantage of its monopoly power to earn more 
than a normal profit, another firm would enter 
and charge the lower price, capturing the entire 
market for itself 
Clearly, not all industries in the 
economy can be considered contestable (the 
auto industry, for example, is definitely not). 
However, deregulation proponents considered 
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the airline industry a good candidate for 
contestability-once the artificial barriers to entry 
created by the CAB were eliminated. 
The following market characteris- 
tics were considered to promote contestability: 
Inputs used by the airline 
industry are all relatively mobile when compared 
to most other industries. Iabor, energy, and mate- 
rials can either be employed or let go on fairly 
short notice, as in most industries, but capital is 
much more mobile than in almost any other 
major industry. 
Airlines can quickly shift planes 
from one route to another as the need arises. 
Further, since there is a ready secondary market 
for used aircraft-in fact, many carriers rent a sig- 
nificant portion of their fleets-planes are fairly 
mobile from one carrier to another. 
Ground facilities are usually 
rented, making them fairly disposable (acquisition 
is another matter, and will be discussed later). 
These properties are thought to 
make it relatively easy for incumbent airlines to 
begin service on new routes, so that if  fares are 
too high on a given route, other airlines will 
enter those markets at lower passenger fares. 
These properties are also thought to facilitate the 
start-up of  new airlines if  existing lines are mak- 
ing more than a normal profit. 
Thus, according to the contestable 
market view, there was little to fear on the part of 
consumers from airline deregulation. Even if  the 
industry did evolve into a handful of  firms, the 
contestable market theory predicted that they 
could only earn a normal profit and fares would 
be as low as possible. 
In summary, the proponents of 
deregulation predicted sharply lower coach fares, 
as fare markups would be bid down and airlines 
would strive to reduce their costs in the face of 
observed and potential competition.  There would 
be some deterioration in service quality as flight 
frequencies would be reduced. However, this 
would in turn lower airline costs (by increasing 
load factors), thus further lowering fares, and pas- 
sengers would receive the fare-service mix that 
they prefer. It was felt that there was no need to 
worry about increased concentration in the air- 
line industry, because the minimum efficient 
scale would be small enough to make room for 
many carriers. Besides, the threat of  entry would 
be sufficient to hold fares down and service qual- 
ity up, even on routes with few carriers. 
111.  The Effects of Airline Deregulation 
The actual effects of airline deregulation,  while 
being generally beneficial to date, have not mate- 
rialized precisely as the proponents predicted. 
This divergence of  prediction and reality can be 
traced to changes in the airlines' operating strate- 
gies that were induced by the increased freedom 
given to them by the elimination of  CAB regula- 
tion. These changes in strategy occurred in the 
two areas mentioned earlier: where to fly and 
how much to charge. Market competition seems 
to have induced even more innovation than 
industry experts foresaw, leading to predomi- 
nately beneficial changes in airline behavior. 
Fares 
As the CAB'S authority over fares was diminished, 
the airlines gradually developed a more complex 
fare structure to replace the relatively simple first- 
class and coach-fare structure that existed under 
regulation. While an element of  price discrimina- 
tion certainly exists, most of  the variation in fares 
is based on differences in the cost of serving the 
various classes of  passengers? Fares are lower for 
travel outside the periods of peak demand. 
mmples include flying on weekends, flying in 
the middle of  the day or late evening, and flying 
to locations that are out of season. A prime 
example of fare differences based primarily on 
cost is found between those who can book and 
pay for tickets in advance and those who cannot. 
It is costly for airlines to fly planes with empty 
seats, yet they intentionally have some slack in 
their systems so that they can accommodate last- 
minute travelers-for a higher price. 
These pricing strategies have 
enabled the airlines to increase both tdc  and 
revenue far more than if  a uniform pricing policy 
had been followed. The increase in the industry's 
revenue passenger miles (RPM)  and average load 
factor are plotted over time in figure 1. Both have 
increased since deregulation, although the effect 
of  the recession in the early 1980s is clearly evi- 
dent. Traffic increased 33 percent just from 1977 
to 1979. 
As a result of this shift in pricing 
strategy, the average fare that passengers actually 
paid (adjusted for inflation) has fallen about 20 
percent in the last 10 years, even though the 
standard coach fare has fallen very little. Thbugh 
this is a far cry from the drop that had been 
expected given the fare markups and inefficiency 
that existed under regulation, it does represent a 
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considerable savings to travelers. A measure of 
the average fares paid by travelers, the average 
passenger revenue per RPM, is plotted along with 
the average operating profit in figure 2. 
All  parties benefited to some 
extent by this new fare structure. The super-low 
fares enabled many leisure travelers to take trips 
they would not have considered before; business 
travelers gained by the increase in flight fre- 
quency on most routes (as a result of the increase 
in traffic) and by the lower fares (for those who 
could qualify for the discount fares); and the air- 
line industry was able to increase its profits over 
what they would have been under regulation as 
the increase in load factors lowered costs. 
Routes 
The other fundamental change in the airlines' strat- 
egies concerns the decision of where to fly. Few 
people inside or outside the industry foresaw the 
shift of the airlines to what is now known as a hub- 
and-spoke system. Since deregulation, instead of 
serving a hodgepodge of routes as dictated by the 
CAB, airlines organized their routes so that most 
of their flights now converge on one or two hubs. 
These hubs collect traffic fi-om the "rim" cities, 
then the passengers change planes at the hub to 
go out on other flights to their final destinations. 
The potential benefits of this system were demon- 
strated to a small extent by Delta Airlines, which 
had a hub in Atlanta even under regulation.8 
The hub-and-spoke system has 
enabled airlines to increase their load factors on 
flights both into and out of  the hub, thus lower- 
ing their costs and enabling them to lower their 
fares. An important side benefit is that flights can 
be scheduled more frequently because of  the 
higher tr&c  density. Thus, instead of flight fre- 
quencies decreasing under deregulation, as was 
generally predicted, they actually increased. Pas- 
sengers are also more likely to be able to com- 
plete their entire trip on one airline (which is 
advantageous to the airlines) and to avoid the 
inconvenience of changing planes at busy air- 
ports (which the passengers like). Another 
benefit is that passengers can fly from almost any 
city to almost any other city without having to 
endure multi-stop flights. Usually a one-stop flight 
can be found, and routes with ~~cient  traffic 
density still receive nonstop service. 
How much are these innovations 
worth to consumers?  Morrison and Winston (1986) 
estimated the total benefit of deregulation to con- 
sumers to be $5.7 billion a year. For the average 
passenger, the benefits per trip were $1  1.08 and 
came fiom the following sources: a gain of $4.04 
from lower fares, a loss of $0.96 from slightly 
increased travel time, and a gain of $8.00 from 
increased flight frequency. Morrison and Winston 
firther estimate that airline profits would have 
been $2.5 billion higher than they were under 
regulation. Thus, airline earnings would have 
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been even worse than they actually were (as 
reported in figure 1) had CAB regulation con- 
tinued. These are substantial aggregate benefits. 
Passenger Concerns 
Even so, the gains of deregulation have not been 
shared equally by all travelers and, in fact, some 
may be worse off. Travelers who do not qualify 
for the discount fares and who must pay the full 
coach fare are probably worse off, unless the 
benefit from the increase in flight frequency is 
sufficient to offset this effect. Also, due to the 
oversupply of wide-body jets, which are ideally 
suited to canying passengefs coast to coast, fares 
for flights between 2,000 and 2,999 miles have 
fallen much more than other fares, so that travel- 
ers on these routes have benefited proportion- 
ately more than travelers on shorter routes. This 
is a temporary benefit, however, and will last only 
until the airlines adjust their fleets. Finally, travel 
time for most flights involving large hubs has 
increased due to the increase in traffic. 
One of the early concerns of 
opponents and even of some supporters of dereg- 
ulation centered on the availability of air service 
to small communities. Provision was made in the 
ADA  for subsidies to help support air service to 
small communities for a period of up to 10 years, 
but many communities were not covered by these 
provisions. However, most small communities, far 
from losing service, have gained service. In gen- 
eral, hedgehopping, multi-stop flights have been 
eliminated (lowering travel time), and flight fre- 
quencies have been increased. Travel time for 
trips involving nonhubs has fallen from one to six 
percent on average.9 While service by trunk air- 
lines has been replaced with service by commuter 
airlines in many cases (which is seen as less desir- 
able), most of these commuter lines have their 
schedules coordinated with a major carrier at the 
connecting hub. When there is provision for on- 
line ticketing, travelers can save approximately 25 
percent over the interline fare. The few commun- 
ities that have lost all service have not had 
enough tr&c  to support scheduled carrier ser- 
vice by any class of carrier. In these cases, service 
could be restored by government subsidies if  the 
a@ected  taxpayers deemed it desirable to do  so. 
Beyond the basic issues of where to 
fly and how much to charge, there is the issue of 
whether the skies have become less safe under de- 
regulation. Generally,  the argument is that compe- 
tition gives airlines an incentive to cut corners on 
An airport is classified as a "nonhub if  its total enplaned revenue 
passenger miles represents less than 0.05  percent of  the total  U.S 
maintenance and to force pilots to fly more hours 
than is prudent. Under regulation, it was claimed 
that this was not a problem because the CAB en- 
sured that the airlines were financially healthy so 
that they would not be as tempted to cut corners. 
So far, the safety record of the air- 
lines is as good as ever, but there is the charge by 
some that the country has simply been lucky. 
There are two responses to this charge. First, it is 
bad for an airline's business for its aircraft to be in- 
volved in an accident that is shown to be a result 
of its own negligence. Not only is the public likely 
to avoid the airline, but the airline would also 
have lost a plane worth millions of dollars and ex- 
posed itself to even greater claims of liability.1° 
Second, and more important, one sure way of forc- 
ing the airlines to perform proper maintenance is 
to step up inspections by the Federal Aviation Ad- 
ministration (FAA). There may be a problem in do- 
ing this, however. The number of airlines and air- 
craft in service has risen dramatically since 1978, 
but the number of FAA  inspectors has remained 
the same due to federal budget constraints. 
A related problem is that the 
number and the level of experience of the 
nation's air traffic controllers has declined since 
deregulation as a result of the Professional Air 
Traffic Controllers' Organization (PATCO) strike 
in the summer of 1981. Thus, if there is a poten- 
tial safety problem, it is likely to arise from 
inadequate attention to inspection and flight con- 
trol, not from deregulation. 
Industry Concerns 
As one might have surmised from the earlier dis- 
cussion of strikes, labor leaders were also con- 
cerned about the effects of deregulation. In fact, 
however, overall employment in the industry is 
up and compensation has kept pace with infla- 
tion. According to data presented by Morrison 
and Winston (1986), from 1975 to 1984, pilots' 
average real income fell a modest $500, dropping 
to $47,720 in 1977 dollars, while that of flight 
attendants increased $1800 to $14,428, and that of 
mechanics increased about $500 to $19,775. 
Industry employment has increased 
since the early 1970s. Employment declined from 
a 1980 peak until 1983 when it rebounded and 
continued the upward trend it followed from 
1971 to 1978 (see Morrison and Winston [19861). 
Though the average worker has not suffered 
1 10 
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under deregulation, many union workers have 
been forced to take wage- and work-rule conces- 
sions, and some have had their careers inter- 
rupted as they have been either laid off or let go 
by airlines performing poorly in the new compet- 
itive environment. Two-tiered labor contracts 
have also been introduced. All this and the 
gromh of the nonunion sector of the industry 
among the entering airlines have induced wide, 
and sometimes surprising,  wage differentials 
between workers for different airlines, so that 
aggregate data on the welfare of workers is 
somewhat misleading.ll 
Finally, some firms may not have 
benefited fiom deregulation. There have been a 
number of bankruptcies in the airline industry 
since deregulation, most notably Braniff Airlines 
and Continental Airlines, which are both still fly- 
ing after Chapter 11 reorganizations. Another air- 
line (Frontier) is not flying, but is being acquired 
by Texas Air. In addition, there have been numer- 
ous mergers, particularly in the last year. Cur- 
rently pending are two large mergers involving 
Continental-Eastern-People  Ejrpress-Frontier  (by 
Texas Air) and Delta-Western, that would create 
the first- and fourth-largest airlines in the US., 
respectively. While business failures impose 
some costs, such as uncertainty and inconve- 
nience on the part of consumers, the loss of jobs 
on the part of workers, and the financial loss to 
creditors and stockholders, failures are a neces- 
sary force to ensure that firms operate efficiently 
in providing the services that consumers desire at 
a cost they are willing to pay. 
IV.  Future Evolution of the Industry 
The current merger wave could be regarded as a 
natural process leading toward a competitive air- 
line industry. Travelers prefer to have nonstop or 
one-stop flights with one carrier, rather than take 
a flight that would require them to endure two or 
more stops, or to change airlines at a busy airport. 
Providing such service requires a national route 
network with several regional hubs. In addition 
to the benefits for travelers, there also might be 
cost advantages to operating such a large hub 
network. Though the cost studies performed dur- 
ing the regulatory period indicated that there 
were no  scale economies in the airline industry, 
the cost inefficiencies present in the regulatoy 
era may have distorted these estimates. Bauer 
(1985)  used an econometric procedure that 
allowed for these inefficiencies and found evi- 
dence of substantial returns to scale (contrary to 
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the cost studies that did not allow for inefi- 
ciency). This issue aside, there are definitely cost 
advantages to the extent that large hub-and-spoke 
systems lead to higher load factors. Currently, 
only United Airlines and American Airlines oper- 
ate such networks. However, once the current 
wave of mergers subsides, there will be anywhere 
from six to eight such super-airlines, perhaps 
another four to six medium-sized carriers, and 
perhaps 10 to 30 regional carriers. 
Should the public be concerned 
about the potential anti-competitive effects of 
these airline mergers? If  the industry were per- 
fectly contestable as discussed earlier, then the 
answer would be no. Many researchers have 
tested whether or not the implications of the the- 
ory of contestable markets hold exactly; unfortu- 
nately, no one has found that they have. Bailey, 
Graham, and Kaplan (1985), for example, found 
that on concentrated routes (routes served by 
only one or two carriers) airlines can raise fares 
five to 10 percent over what they could charge on 
nonconcentrated routes. 
There are two reasons why actual 
and potential competition have not lived up to 
their promise in the airline industry. First, 
capital-both physical and human capital-may 
not have fully adjusted to the new deregulated 
environment. The number of merger proposals re- 
cently is evidence that the airline industry is not 
in a long-run equilibrium with respect to the 
number and size distribution of carriers. Given 
that it has been eight years since the formal dereg- 
ulation process started, it appears that the transi- 
tion from a regulated to a competitive market 
equilibrium will take longer than expected. 
A second reason for the apparent 
lack of competition on some routes is that entry 
into some concentrated markets is not as easy as 
was first expected. Many airports across the coun- 
try have severe problems with trac  congestion 
(for example, airports in Denver and Washington, 
D.C.); obtaining gates and takeoff and landing 
slots at these airports is difficult. Since gates and 
landing rights are "grandfathered to the airline 
holding them as long as they are used, the air- 
lines that have these scarce resources can earn 
monopoly returns from them. This creates a 
severe barrier to entry for airlines wishing to 
begin service on these routes. The importance of 
this problem was highlighted in the recent 
merger of Continental Airlines with Eastern Air- 
lines. To get approval for the merger, slots at 
IaGuardia airport had to be sold to Pan-Am so 
that it could set up a competing shuttle service. 
Even at relatively uncongested airports, such as 
Cleveland Hopkins, airlines are reluctant to 
release unused gate space. Much of the impetus 
for the current merger wave is that airlines find it 
is easier to buy other airlines to expand (in an 
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effort to reach the most efficient size) than it is to 
grow internally (and be forced to try to obtain 
takeoff and landing slots on their own).I2 
Given that the contestable market 
theory does not seem to apply on all routes, 
should consumers worry about the increasing 
concentration of the industry?  Currently, the 
national four-firm concentration ratio (CR), the 
sum of the market shares of the largest four firms 
in an industry, has remained unchanged at 47 
from 1975 to 1986. Depending on how the cur- 
rent merger proposals are approved, it is likely 
that the resulting concentration ratio for the 
industry will be anywhere from 57 to 61. While 
this is high enough to cause concern, particularly 
in light of the fact that some individual city pairs 
now have even higher concentration ratios, there 
are reasons not to become alarmed just yet. 
First, even though the industry has 
a fairly small number of firms, and concentration 
is relatively high, fare and route competition has 
been intense since deregulation. There have 
been no accusations that the industry as a whole 
is earning more than a normal profit. Further- 
more, to the extent that only large airlines can 
provide the national route structure and the 
potential for nonstop and one-stop service that 
consumers prefer at the lowest cost, the level of 
concentration is only a reflection of the fact that 
there is only room for a limited number of effi- 
ciently sized airlines in the market. 
If  the ultimate effect of deregula- 
tion is a national market with six to eight huge 
airlines, there still would be a great deal of com- 
petition in the industry, even if  many of the major 
cities are dominated by as few as two carriers. If 
one wants to fly fiom Cleveland to Los Angeles, 
for exalnple, there may only be one or two air- 
lines to choose from that provide nonstop service. 
However, one-stop service is a close substitute for 
nonstop service and, in that case, one would con- 
ceivably have six to eight choices depending upon 
which hub city he or she preferred to change 
planes. On shorter routes, such as Cleveland to 
Chicago, the smaller regional carriers would pro- 
vide additional competition to the major carriers 
and thereby put a check on fares.l3 On still short- 
A further cause of  the increased merger activity now is that  1  2  the Department of  Transportation (DOT) has authMty over air- 
line mergers for the next two years, at which time the Department of  Jus- 
tice (DOJ) will have that responsibility. The  DOT  has been much more 
lenient than the DOJ. 
If they cannot obtain space at the major airports on the route 
in question, they have the aircraft that can effectively utilize 
the smaller regional airports which, in some cases, may be more conve- 
nient for passengers. 
er flights, Cleveland to Columbus for example, sur- 
face transportation provides some additional com- 
petition even if the market for air travel between 
those points is concentrated. Given the shortcom- 
ings of the contestable market theory as applied 
to the airline industry, however, the disciplining 
effect of potential competition may not be enough 
to ensure competitive behavior. It may still be 
necessary for the Departments of Transportation 
and  Justice to enforce current antitrust laws. 
In summary, at this point, the mar- 
ket for air travel in the U.S. is not perfectly contes- 
table and, on some concentrated routes, airlines 
are able to charge modest fare markups on the 
order of between 5 and 10 percent. This situation 
is likely to continue for the foreseeable future, 
until steps are taken to alleviate the congestion 
problems at certain airports. The next few years 
will probably witness an increase in the concen- 
tration in the industry to the point where six to 
eight large airlines dominate the national market 
with a host of smaller regional and commuter 
lines filling a variety of special niches. There will 
be sufficient competition to ensure that travelers 
are better off than they were under regulation, 
but it remains to be seen how closely the indus- 
try will conform to the perfectly contestable ideal 
that was envisaged by proponents of deregulation. 
V.  Conclusion 
Deregulation of the airline industry has been a 
painful experience for some travelers, workers, 
and firms. large fuel price increases, the air trfic 
controllers' strike, and recessions have made the 
process even more difficult. On the whole, how- 
ever, deregulation has been favorable. Far more 
individuals have benefited than have been hurt. 
Consumers are receiving better service for lower 
average fares; employment and compensation in 
the industry are up; and the airlines are generally 
earning higher profits than they would have 
under regulation.  Yet, even eight years later, the 
industry is still adjusting to its new environment, 
and the final results of deregulation have yet to 
be determined. 
There are several steps that can be 
taken to ensure that the gains to date are not lost 
and that the costs of adjustment to deregulation 
are minimized. First, airport expansion is needed 
to help reduce one of the few barriers to entry 
that remain in the industry. Deregulation, by great- 
ly increasing air travel through lower fares, made 
the congestion worse. The solution, however, is 
not to reduce air travel, but to expand the system. 
The federal government has a $3.5 
billion fund that can be spent only on promoting 
air travel. This fund is financed by an 8 percent 
tax on air fares, but has become embroiled in the 
current federal budget problems. The money 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
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could be spent to expand airport facilities, to 
modernize the air traffic control system, and to 
hire more FAA  inspectors.  These expenditures 
would enhance the competitiveness of the system 
by lessening the incentives for airlines to merge, 
as well as by improving their safety and reliability. 
Second, the U.S. Departments of 
Transportation and Justice should continue to 
enforce existing antitrust laws. While the compet- 
itive discipline that fiee-entry  into the industry 
offers should not be ignored, it is important that 
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